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Abstract
An extensive literature shows the importance of investment policy for sus-
tainability of resource-based economies. The approaches of these studies are
mostly based on theoretical results that examine the role of investments in
a competitive optimizing economy. This paper extends some of these results
by considering the dependence of current consumption change on investment
under distortions causing modication of the standard Hotelling rule (HR).
This extension implies that resource policy in the presence of the distortions
can be more important for sustainability than under the standard HR. The
examples of the analysis for distorted resource-based economies are provided.
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1. Introduction
Hamilton and Hartwick (2005, p. 615) noted that the magnitude of net
investmentor genuine savingshas become a central focus in the measure-
ment of the sustainability of an economy.For example, Pearce and Atkinson
(1993) has o¤ered a simple indicator of weak sustainability1 based on the as-
sertion that an economy is sustainable if it saves more than the combined
depreciation on the two forms of capital(man-made and natural). A vari-
ant of this indicator, modied for open economies, has been developed in
Proops et al. (1999). These indicators were used in both papers to clas-
sify a number of countries into sustainable and unsustainable. Hamilton and
Clemens (1999) developed a theory of genuine saving by adding the invest-
ment in human capital to traditional net savings and subtracting the value of
resource depletion and environmental damage. The value of genuine saving
was o¤ered as an indicator of sustainability, and this indicator was used for
comparing sustainability of a wide range of developing countries.
Historically, this keen attention to investment policies in empirical re-
search of sustainability originates from importance of investment in economic
theory in general; in particular, this interest stems from theoretical studies
of perfectly competitive resource-based economies satisfying the standard
Hotelling rule (HR) as a necessary condition of dynamic e¢ ciency. For ex-
ample, Solow (1986) showed for Weitzmans (1976) model with utilitarian
criterion and a constant discount rate, coinciding with the xed rate of in-
terest, that investment of the resource rent into man-made capital (Hartwick
investment rule) at a specic moment of time results in a constant consump-
tion path starting from this moment.2
Asheim (1994) provided a counterexample, which was infeasible forWeitz-
mans framework, using the Dasgupta-Heal-Solow-Stiglitz (DHSS) economy
(Dasgupta and Heal, 1974; Solow, 1974; Stiglitz, 1974), where the rate of
interest asymptotically declines to zero. In this model, consumption declines
to zero under utilitarian criterion for any xed positive discount rate despite
satisfaction of the Hartwick rule at some time. The standard Solow (1974)
- Hartwick (1977) case implies for the DHSS economy that per capita con-
1Weak sustainability of growth (development) is dened by Pezzey (1992) as nonde-
creasing per capita consumption (utility).
2Svensson (1986) noted that the requirement of the constant discount rate is quite
restrictive in this model.
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sumption is constant at a maximum sustainable level if the Hartwick rule is
satised at any time. Dixit et al. (1980) generalized the Hartwick rule by
showing that net investment (increase in man-made capital minus resource
depletion) that is nonnegative and constant over time in present prices is a
necessary and su¢ cient condition for a constant path of utility.3 Dasgupta
and Heal (1979, pp. 303-306), Hamilton and Hartwick (2005), and Hamil-
ton et al. (2006) analyzed the link between genuine investment in current
prices and current change in per capita consumption. Hamilton and With-
agen (2007) derived the result of Hamilton and Hartwick (2005) in a more
general setting, showing that instantaneous utility increases if and only if
genuine investment decreases in present prices remaining positive.
However, as Hamilton et al. (2006) fairly noted, saving e¤ort is ... not
the whole story in sustaining development. It is known (e.g., Neumayer
2000) that the main uncertainties for sustainability are connected with the
properties of production function, in particular, with technical progress and
substitutability between natural and man-made forms of capital. These un-
certainties depend of course on investment in R&D and, therefore, not only
on the rate but also on the structure of investment.4
Uncertainties depend also on the paths of imperfections including such
phenomena as insecure property rights, taxes, and other distortions that
modify the standard HR. For example, Stollery (1998) considered an ex-
ternality (climate change) that modied the HR and distorted the Solow-
Hartwick path of extraction. This distorted extraction resulted in sustainable
bounded growth of per capita consumption for the DHSS model under the
standard Hartwick rule. Another example for the same model was provided in
Bazhanov (2007), where the properties of transition paths were examined un-
der a modied HR. The Hartwick rule also yielded bounded and unbounded
consumption growth depending only on the path of extraction. The standard
HR can be violated either in the optimal economy under distortions or in an
ine¢ cient economy. Besides dynamic ine¢ ciency, the resource use in the real
world can be static-ine¢ cient, wasteful, and even counter-productive.5
3Constant investment in present prices means that investment in current prices is grow-
ing with the rate of discount.
4Another problem of empirical sustainability evaluation, discussed in the review of
Neumayer (2000), is that the real-life paths of the market price and extraction cost do not
work as reliable indicators of the resource scarcity.
5The resource use is counter-productive when the decline in the resource stock results
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The examples above show the need to further examine the roles of invest-
ment and resource policies for economies with imperfections. Straightforward
applications of the results derived under the standard HR to real-world situ-
ations can form the impression that, for sustainability, it is enough to invest
in a proper way into man-made and human capital regardless of the pat-
tern of extraction. As Arrow et al. (2003) showed for imperfect economies,
the accounting price of a natural resource can be considerably higher than
the market price, implying that the investment of the market resource rent
and even the entire marked-valued output into man-made capital can be not
enough to compensate for damages in natural capital. In other words, gen-
uine investment in accounting prices can be negative despite any e¤ort in
saving. In these cases, sustainability cannot be achieved without estimation
and correction of resource extracting policies.
This paper generalizes Proposition 1 of Hamilton and Hartwick (2005) by
introducing distortions modifying the standard HR. This result (Proposition
1) shows that current consumption change can be completely determined
by the inuence of distortion when this inuence is not close to zero. The
result implies a classication of resource-based economies by the importance
of investment or resource policies or both for current consumption change.
Section 3 illustrates Proposition 1 using the examples of distorted economies;
Section 4 discusses possible problems with using Proposition 1 for sustain-
ability evaluation, and Section 5 concludes.
2. Investment and growth under distortions
In order to dene a distorted economy, it is instructive to introduce rst
a perfectoptimizing economy. Following Hamilton and Hartwick (2005, p.
618), assume that the economy is closed, time t is continuous, consumption
is aggregated into a single consumption good C; labor is xed, so that output
Q(t) = F (K;R) depends on man-made capital K(t) and the resource ow
R(t) =   _S(t); where S(t) is the current resource stock ( _S := dS=dt).
A number of studies, which results were used for practical evaluation of
sustainability, assume that the economy satises the following:
 F (K;R) is a regular production function that (a) denotes the maximum
output for the given K and R; and (b) satises the Inada conditions, in
particular FR > 0; where FR := @F=@R (resource productiveness);
in the decline of output, e.g., as a result of a wildre or oil spill.
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 output Q equals F (K;R) (static e¢ ciency);6
 the balance equation holds: C + _K = F (K;R)   K; where _K is
investment and K with  = const is capital decay (non-wastefulness);
 the standard HR _FR = rFR7 holds as a necessary condition of dynamic
e¢ ciency;
 the paths in the economy maximize a welfare function (optimality).
In the real world, however, the resource use can be
counter-productive: FR  0;
productive, but static-ine¢ cient: Q < F (K;R);
productive, static-e¢ cient, but wasteful: C + _K < F (K;R)  K;
productive, non-wasteful, e¢ cient, but non-optimal.
This paper provides another small step towards practical evaluation of
sustainability. The paper extends Hamilton and Hartwick (2005) only by
assuming that the HR deviates from its standard form. The vector D(t) =
(D1(t); D2(t); D3(t); D4(t)) called distortion denotes possible sources of the
deviation. Here, Di are the distortions in
production: F = F (K;R;D1); (1)
social utility: U = U(C;D2); (2)
the balance equation: _K = F (K;R;D1)  C   K  D3; (3)
the dynamics of the stock: _S =  R +D4: (4)
The distortions can include imperfections, externalities, and any e¤ects (in-
cluding favorable for sustainability) that cause violation of the standard HR.
Assume, for simplicity, that D depends only on the extracted amount
S0   S(t):8 For example, D1 and D2 can result from irreversible damages
6Conventionally, e¢ ciency is dened via the Pareto-optimality. Some studies, e.g.
Hurwicz (1960), called this notion non-wastefulness.
7Here, r(t) := FK(t)   is the market interest rate.
8D can also depend on the rate of extraction, e.g., when damage includes the oppor-
tunity cost (Gaudet et al., 2006), or when damage is partly reversible. Then formula (6)
below is more complicated, which, however, does not alter the conclusions of the paper.
D can also depend on the amount of non-extracted resource, e.g., when the stock has an
amenity value (DAutume, Schubert, 2008). Then, if this value can be expressed in terms
of utility, the problem can be reformulated by introducing the damage resulted from the
resource extraction. In practice, this approach can be more precise, since the uncertainty
in the extracted amount is essentially less than in the remaining stock. A review of studies
with the modied HR can be found, e.g., in Gaudet (2007).
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caused by economic activities (e.g., due to climate change); D3 can stand for
the growing cost of extraction (best-quality stock extracted rst); D4 can be
the productivity of the stock-augmenting investment, which is, rst, growing
with the extraction due to learning-by-doing and eventually declining due to
the scarcity of the resource. Then the following result holds.
Lemma 1. If economy (1)-(4) is dynamically e¢ cient, then
_FR = [v(t) + (t)]FR; (5)
where v(t) := FK   ;9 and (t) =  [D(t)] :=
1
FR

UD2@D2=@(S0   S)
UC
+ FD1
@D1
@(S0   S)  
@D3
@(S0   S)

+
@D4
@(S0   S) (6)
is the additive HR modier or the inuence of D:10
Proof is in Appendix.
Genuine investment is dened in Hamilton and Hartwick (2005) as
G(t) := _K(t) + _S(t)FR(t): (7)
This measure includes not only current investment into man-made capital
but the value of the currently extracted resource measured in marginal re-
source productivity, which, with no distortion, coincides with the market
price. Under distortions, the link between G and _C takes the following form.
Proposition 1. Current consumption change is
_C = (v   _G=G)G+	; (8)
where 	 := _D1FD1   _D3    [D]FRR is the inuence of the distortion D:
Proof is identical to the proof of Proposition 1 in Hamilton and Hartwick
(2005). The only di¤erence is that formula (5) is used here to substitute
for _FR instead of the standard HR. Namely, equations (3), (1), and (7) give
_C = _KFK+ _RFR+ _D1FD1  _K  K  _D3 = _KFK+ _RFR+ _D1FD1  _K  K 
9v(t) is the market interest rate only with no distortion.
10With no distortion,  = 0: The inuence of D in equation (5) can be expressed in a
multiplicative form: _FR = v [D]FR; where  [D] := 1 +  [D] =v:
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_D3+R _FR R _FR = (FK ) _K (FK )FRR  _G  [D]FRR + _D1FD1  _D3
= vG  _G+ _D1FD1   _D3    [D]FRR 
With no distortion (	 = 0), Proposition 1 coincides with the result of
Hamilton and Hartwick (2005) and with the result of Hamilton andWithagen
(2007), expressed in present prices. Equation (8) shows, that investment (7)
can indeed determine _C if 	 is relatively small. However, _C can be also
completely determined by D when the term

v   _G=G

G is close to zero.
Of course, sharp changes in G can determine an instant sign of _C despite
the large values of 	: Formula (8) shows that even when 	 has a large
positive (negative) value for some t = t, _C(t) can be negative (positive)
if G(t) is negative (positive) and _G(t)=G(t) has a large positive (negative)
value. However, these cases are not relevant to sustainability due to the
boundedness of investments, whereas distortions in general are less restricted.
The boundedness of investment implies that the larger is 	; the shorter is
the period of time when these cases are possible. Therefore, neglecting the
short-run oscillations, it can be assumed that
 _G=G < v along the long-
run trends.11 Assume also, for determinateness, that v(t) > 0 for all t > 0
and the current investment _K is bounded by the current output Q: Then a
feasible investment can be dened as follows.
Denition 1. Investment _K(t) = w(t)Q(t) is feasible if w(t) 2 (0; 1) and
j _G=Gj < v for any t > 0:
Denition 1 results in the following Corollaries.
Corollary 1. Equation (8) implies that
(I) _C R 0 i¤
	 R  

v   _G=G

G or G R  	=

v   _G=G

; (9)
(II) a feasible investment policy can change the sign of _C i¤
 

v   _G=G

(Q RFR) < 	 <

v   _G=G

RFR: (10)
11The analysis can be easily complemented by the case with
 _G=G > v:
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Corollary 2. If _D1FD1   _D3 = 0; equation (8) implies that
(I) _C R 0 i¤
 Q

v   _G=G
 h
_K= (RFR)  1
i
or G R RFR=

v   _G=G

;
(II) a feasible investment policy can change the sign of _C i¤
 

v   _G=G

<  <

v   _G=G

[Q= (RFR)  1] :
The following examples show that the impact of distortions on the e¢ cacy
of investment depends on the level of output and the share of the resource
rent in output. Assume that v(t) = 0:06 and _G(t)=G(t) = 0:03 at t > 0:
(a) Large resource-poor economy. Let Q(t) = 101 and R(t)FR(t) =
1: Then (Corollary 1) an investment policy can change the sign of _C(t) i¤
 3 < 	 < 0:03:
(b) Small resource-rich economy. Let Q(t) = 11 and R(t)FR(t) =
10: Then an investment policy can a¤ect the sign of _C(t) i¤
 0:03 < 	 < 0:3:
It is intuitive that a large economy has more opportunities in investment
than a small one, and so the range for 	; in which investment is able to a¤ect
the sign of consumption change, is about ten times larger in case (a) than in
case (b). Another di¤erence between these two cases is that investment in a
large resource-poor economy can change the sign of _C mostly when 	 a¤ects
_C negatively. In this example, the range of negative 	; in which investment
is able to compensate for the inuence of distortion, is 100 times larger than
the range of positive 	; which e¤ect can be annihilated by negative G: This
asymmetry is inverted in a small resource-rich economy.
Boundedness of investments implies that sustainability evaluation should
include the analysis of distortions. Depending on the inuence of distortions
	; the states of an economy can be subdivided into the following four types.
(A) 	 6  

v   _G=G

(Q RFR) : consumption declines regardless of
saving; sustainability can be improved only by reduction of the distortion if
it is still possible.
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(B)  

v   _G=G

(Q RFR) < 	 < 0 : consumption growth can be
achieved by investment policy alone; the optimal saving rate can be higher
than under 	 = 0 in order to compensate not only for the exhausting natural
capital but for the negative e¤ect of distortions. Without a policy reducing
this e¤ect, the level of consumption can be lower than under 	 = 0:
(C) 0 < 	 <

v   _G=G

RFR : the optimal saving rate can be lower than
under 	 = 0 due to the positive e¤ect of 	; decline in consumption is still
possible when G < 0:
(D) 	 >

v   _G=G

RFR : consumption grows regardless of investments;
investment policy is important as a determinant of the level of consumption
along the growing path.
Condition (9) shows that, for 	 < 0; the minimum investment G; pro-
viding non-declining consumption, can be essentially higher than zero. The
following section illustrates that in some cases the sustainable minimum of
G does not exist.
3. Examples of distortions
3.1. Insecure property rights
Following Arrow et al. (2003, p. 664), assume that the owner i (i =
1 : : : N ;N > 2) extracts a liquid resource from the pool with the stock Si:
All N owners are identical, non-cooperative, and the pools are separated by
porous barriers. The resource di¤uses from larger pools to smaller ones with
the same rate  > 0:12 Then the depletion equations are _Si = 
P
j 6=i(Sj  
Si)   Ri; i = 1:::N; where Ri is the rate of extraction of the owner i. The
necessary conditions for PV-maximization of the each owners utility yield
equation (5) with  = (N   1) > 0: This distortion negatively a¤ects
consumption (Proposition 1), and causes socially ine¢ cient paths. Let D1
and D3 are constants, v = 0:06; and _G=G =  0:04: Then (Corollary 2) a
feasible investment policy can change the sign of _C i¤
(N   1) < 0:1 [Q= (RFR)  1] :
When this condition is not satised, only institutional changes or resource
policies can prevent decline in consumption. Consumption is not declining
12No barriers corresponds to !1:
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here if
w > [10(N   1)+ 1] (RFR=Q) or G > 10(N   1)RFR > 0;
which is very restrictive for N > 1:
It is illustrative to consider two cases.
(a) Large resource-poor economy (Q = 101; RFR = 1). In this case, _K
can change the sign of _C i¤ (N   1) < 10; which means, e.g., that, for
 = 1; consumption declines for any investment (type A) if N > 11: Let
N = 5: Then the saving rate, compensating for the shrinking resource and
ine¢ ciency, should be no less than wmin = 41101 (or G > 40), whereas with no
distortion (N = 1), consumption grows for any w > 1
101
(or G > 0).
(b) Small resource-rich economy (Q = 11; RFR = 10). _K can change the
sign of _C i¤ (N   1) < 0:01; i.e., for  > 0:01 and N > 2; consumption
declines regardless of any feasible investment. Let  = 0:009 and N =
2: Then not declining consumption is possible when almost all output is
being invested, namely, w > 10:9
11
(or G > 0:9), although, for this resource-
dependent economy, even with no distortion, the saving rate yielding at least
constant consumption must be very high, namely, wmin = RFR=Q  0:91:
3.2. Resource-augmenting technical change
Assume that the dynamics of the resource stock is _S =  R+ S(LR=L);
where LR=L is the share of the resource-augmenting research sector and
() > 0 is the rate of growth of the resource stock due to research (Takayama,
1980). Under the constant D1 and D3; this problem yields condition (5) with
 =  ; which corresponds to the economy of type C or D depending on the
behavior of : Consumption is growing if G >  RFR=

v   _G=G

:
This form of the distortion D4 can describe the policy of a resource-rich
country that enjoys a high level of non-declining consumption, despite nega-
tive G; due to the reserve-expanding research. However, for a nonrenewable
resource, this temporary prosperity does not relate to sustainability, since the
return of the stock-augmenting investment is, in reality, eventually declining
function of the extracted resource.
3.3. Irreversible climate change
Stollery (1998) examined a problem with the damage D1 = D2 = D
caused by climate change,13 resulting from oil use (DS0 S(t) > 0). D nega-
13For the various forms of damage function in this case, see Weitzman (2010).
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tively a¤ects social utility and production: UD 6 0; FD 6 0; UC > 0: This
problem yields equation (5) with  = (FD + UD=UC)DS0 S(t)=FR: The in-
uence of D on _C is 	 = _DFD   (FD + UD=UC)RDS0 S(t): Since _D =
 DS0 S(t) _S = RDS0 S(t) > 0;14 then 	 =  RDS0 S(t)UD=UC :
Stollery used the Bellman-Jacobi-Hamilton equation to show that G  0
maximizes a welfare functionW :=
R1
0
Ue tdt  U = const:15 Proposition
1 yields a more general result. Namely, the current utility change is _U =
UC _C + UD _D; and
_C =

v   _G=G

G  _DUD=UC : (11)
Then
_U =

v   _G=G

GUC ; (12)
i.e., the result of Hamilton and Hartwick (2005) is valid in this economy.
Formula (11) shows that this e¢ cient and optimal economy corresponds
to type C or type D when UD < 0: Consumption grows here even with G < 0;
whenG > _DUD=
h
UC

v   _G=G
i
; due to a reallocation of the part of the re-
source from the present to the future in comparison with the Solow-Hartwick
case (no damage). This reallocation results from a positive declining tax.
The tax causes the lower rate of the initial extraction (lower initial con-
sumption) and the slower rate of the decline in the rates of extraction or the
thicker tail of the distribution of the resource among generations. However,
growing consumption with G < 0 results in declining utility when _G=G < v;
which means that the damage can override the benets from growth, and
that consumption is not always a good proxy for utility.
4. Multiple resources and distortions
Proposition 1 can be generalized in a straightforward way for n resources
and m types of distortions.16 Then formula (7) becomes
G(t) := _K(t) 
nX
i=1
Ri(t)FRi(t); (13)
14Damage depends on time here only via the path of extraction.
15This representation of the maximin was o¤ered by Leonard and Long (1992).
16For simplicity, m is the same for D1; : : : ; D4:
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and, applying the same approach for the proof, the combined inuence of the
distortions D1; :::;Dm on consumption can be dened as
	 :=
mX
j=1

_Dj1FDj1   _Dj3

 
nX
i=1
 iFRiRi; (14)
where  i is the inuence of distortions on the HR (5) for the resource Ri:
Equations (8) and (14) show that the combined e¤ect of all distortions
on the current change of aggregate consumption can be positive despite the
unsustainable extraction of some resources. The problem originates from
the assumption that the components of consumption are substitutes. This
assumption implies a specic way of aggregation of all the factors that can
inuence consumption and utility. Then, for example, according to formula
(14), a common pool situation ( > 0) for one resource can be compensated
by the resource-augmenting investment ( < 0) for another resource. A
sustainability indicator using this aggregation will show total sustainability
despite the known problems in the future.
A natural way of solving this problem is a disaggregation of consumption,
for example, by separating some factors (e.g., transport, food, or health)
that are complements in real life. Then the change in utility could be
_U = d
dt
[min ff1(C1); :::; fl(Cl)g] ; where C1; :::; Cl are complements in con-
sumption and f1; :::; fl are monotonically increasing functions. If fk(Ck) =
min ff1(C1); :::; fl(Cl)g ; then the bottleneck factor Ck determines the current
consumption and utility changes implying the reinterpretations of formulas
(13) and (14), where capital and production function would relate to the in-
dustry, producing Ck; rather than to the whole economy. This approach leads
to policies similar to the maximin principle the main e¤ort is concentrated
on the improvements in the weakestindustry.
However, this replacement of one scalar indicator by another cannot solve
the problem in general because the concentration on improvement in the
most vulnerable sector can be accompanied by increasing unsustainability in
another. Then, in order to verify sustainability of all vital aspects of con-
sumption, sustainability should be evaluated independently for each aspect.
Unfortunately, even in the case of disaggregated evaluation, the use of
formulas (8), (13), and (14) in sustainability indicators cannot prevent trou-
bles in the future. For example, negative values of  i can result in positive
values of sustainability indicators. But  i < 0 is associated with the slower
decline in the rates of extraction (Sections 3.2 and 3.3) and even with the
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growing rates,17 implying that government can stimulate resource-extracting
industries in order to increase the value of the indicator. It is known that
this policy, indeed, provides the short-run benets but eventually ends up in
overextraction followed by a sharp decline in the extraction rates and con-
sumption. The sharp decline in the extraction rates is linked to the switch
to positive values of  i; and this switch cannot be prevented by government
interventions due to the limitedness of the resource.18 This sharp decline in
resource input will result in declining consumption contradicting the deni-
tion of sustainability.
The inuence of distortions on sustainability is similar to the one of in-
vestment policies due to the boundedness of the resource stock. Indeed,
formula (8) with 	  0 shows that consumption can grow in the short run
due to declining investments even when G < 0 (when _G=G > v); although
this case has nothing to do with sustainability, since the boundedness of the
saving rate and the resource reserve will eventually result in _G=G < v and in
_C < 0: Future growth in consumption is possible, but only after a period of
decline. The case with G > 0 is di¤erent because this reserve of investment
can be used during the innite period of time by maintaining this level of
G or asymptotically diminishing it to zero, which will positively a¤ect con-
sumption change during this period. However, a positive G by itself cannot
guarantee sustainability, because consumption will decline when _G=G > v:
In the same way, the instant sign of 	 shows only current inuence of dis-
tortions on _C; whereas sustainability depends on the trends. Hence, Propo-
sition 1 and an indicator based on formula (8) can, of course, provide useful
policy recommendations for underinvesting and overextracting economies;
however, such an indicator, calibrated for a specic economy, cannot guar-
antee even theoretically the existence of at least one economic program with
non-declining consumption during a long period of time, and it cannot show
if the ability of the economy to maintain non-declining consumption is im-
proving.19
17See, e.g., Bazhanov (2008, formula (2)) and Bazhanov (2011).
18To be more precise, the limitedness of the resource implies that the switch to the rates
of extraction declining slower ( i < 0) than in the Solow-Hartwick case ( i  0) after
a period of overextraction is possible but only after a period of faster decline ( i > 0),
causing decline in consumption.
19E.g., in an overconsuming economy with _C > 0, this ability is declining.
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5. Concluding remarks
The paper has extended the result of Hamilton and Hartwick (2005) re-
garding the role of genuine investment in current consumption change by
introducing distortions modifying the Hotelling rule (HR). Proposition 1,
Corollary 1, and Corollary 2 have shown that current consumption change
can be determined by genuine investment, measured in the marginal resource
productivity, only when the inuence of the distortions is close to zero. These
results entail a classication of the status of a resource-based economy by the
importance of investment or resource policies or both for current consumption
change. It was shown that the distortions asymmetrically a¤ect the ability
of investment to control current consumption change, and this asymmetry
is di¤erent for capital-rich-resource-poor and for capital-poor-resource-rich
countries.
The results imply the additional challenges for empirical evaluation of
sustainability: except trade e¤ects, like in Proops et al. (1999), the inuence
of the distortions should be taken into account. Besides, a resource policy,
based on these results, should be more conservative than it can be prescribed
by expression (8) in Proposition 1, since this proposition extends the previous
studies only by introducing the modied HR, not considering other real-life
imperfections. Another problem with expression (8) is that it does not show
the change in the ability of the economy to maintain non-declining consump-
tion (utility) during a long period of time. Arrow et al. (2003) showed that,
in order to estimate current sustainability change, the accounting prices can
be used for measuring genuine investment, when these prices are observable.
Thus a sustainability indicator presumably should contain not only the values
of current investment and the rate of extraction, but the amounts of capital,
resource reserve, and the information about moderate (preferably underesti-
mating) assumptions concerning the paths of production possibilities.
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7. Appendix. Proof of Lemma 1
Since the optimal paths are e¢ cient, a necessary condition of dynamic ef-
ciency for economy (1)-(4) can be obtained from optimality conditions, e.g.,
in the problem of PV-maximization20 of
R1
0
U(C;D2)e
 tdt with a constant
discount rate : The Hamiltonian of this problem is H = U(C;D2)e t +
K(F   C   K   D3) + S(D4   R); and the Pontryagin-type necessary
conditions are
HC = UCe
 t   K = 0; (15)
HR = KFR   S = 0; (16)
_K =  
@H
@K
=  K (FK   ) ; (17)
_S =  
@H
@S
=  e tUD2
@D2
@ (S0   S)
@ (S0   S)
@S
 
K

FD1
@D1
@ (S0   S)
@ (S0   S)
@S
  @D3
@ (S0   S)
@ (S0   S)
@S

 
S
@D4
@ (S0   S)
@ (S0   S)
@S
: (18)
Equation (18) with K from (15) becomes
_S = e
 tUD2D2(S0 S) +
UCe
 t

FD1D1(S0 S)  D3(S0 S)

+ SD4(S0 S) : (19)
The time derivative of equation (16) is _S = _KFR + K _FR; which, com-
bined with (19), results in
_KFR + K _FR = e
 t
h
UD2D2(S0 S) + UC

FD1D1(S0 S)  D3(S0 S)
i
+
SD4(S0 S) :
The last equation after dividing through by FR and substitutions for _K
(from (17)) and S (from (16)) becomes
 K (FK   ) + K
_FR
FR
=
e t
FR
h
UD2D2(S0 S) + UC

FD1D1(S0 S)  D3(S0 S)
i
+
KD4(S0 S) ;
20The maximin, formulated as maxr;c
R1
0
Ue tdt  U = const(r; c) with the addi-
tional constraint U(C;D2) = U; yields the same result.
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which, divided through by K with substitution for K from (15), yields
_FR=FR = FK    +  (D) ; where  (D) is dened by formula (6).
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